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Abstract
In this paper, a basic theoretical model of residential water consumption that adequately repre-
sents consumer behavior when facing a nonlinear budget constraint is developed. The theoret-
ical model for an individual consumer is adapted to yield an aggregate model that essentially
preserves the structure of the demand function for the individual. The model is used to study
the inﬂuence of prices and nonprice conservation programs on consumption and conservation
behavior in three water districts in the San Francisco Bay Area. The empirical results show
that pricing can be an effective tool in reducing water consumption but, when the inﬂuence of
conservation programs is controlled for, the pricing effect is mitigated. Use restrictions and
landscapingauditsappeartobeparticularlyeffective ininducingconservation fromconsumers.
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1. Introduction
The increased frequency of droughts, diminishing supplies of high quality water, and reduced
reliability of current supplies in nearly all parts of the U.S. have deepened the need to understand
both residential water consumptionand conservationbehavior. It has becomeincreasingly difﬁcult
to add to current water supplies both in terms of costs, including environmental costs, and supply
reliability, hence water district managers have turned their attention to improved management of
existingsupplies. Westudytheimpactoftheireffortstomanipulatepricestructuresandimplement
non-price measures to induce conservation.
We analyze residential water consumption and conservation behavior of three water districts
in the San Francisco Bay Area before and during a drought.1 Beginning with the rainy season
of 1987-1988, the Bay Area suffered from a drought that ultimately lasted seven years. As the
droughtcontinued,allwater districtsrespondedwithpolicymeasuresto reducedemandandinduce
conservation. The water districts in our study serve the communities of Great Oaks, San Leandro,
and San Mateo. During the drought, average annual water consumption per household in the
community of Great Oaks fell from 33.55 ccf to 27.02 hundred cubic feet (ccf) during the drought.
Similarly, the drought led to a decrease in average consumption from 10.82 ccf to 8.36 ccf in San
Leandro and from 12.81 ccf to 11.39 ccf in San Mateo. To understand the role of conservation
measures in these reductions, we formulate an empirical speciﬁcation that allows us to analyze the
inﬂuence of pricing and non-price conservation programs on water demand using aggregate panel
data.
Oneoftheprincipletoolsawaterdistricthastoinﬂuenceconsumptionbehaviorispricestructure.
In recent years, increasing block rate structures have been instituted in numerous water districts in
1Our data collection efforts originally focussed on nine Bay Area water districts. Unfortunately, due to data
limitations we are only able to analyze three districts. The communities chosen for this study correspond to those
included in the study by Bruvold (1979) of conservation during a previous drought in the San Francisco Bay Area.
1order to induce conservation by charging a lower price for small amounts of consumption and a
higherpriceforunitsaboveacertainthreshold. Giventheprevalenceofblockratepricing,wemodel
the consumption decision with a nonlinear budget constraint and aggregate the model to overcome
the need for expensive micro-level survey data. Our empirical results show that price policies are
signiﬁcant in combating the drought and that the inﬂuence that price has on consumption is greater
in periods of drought. It is not clear whether this result is due to consumers reacting to the change
in price policy as a signal of the severity of the drought, or whether this result truly represents a
price effect.
Of course, non-market tools are also available to water utility districts in their efforts to induce
conservation. Forthisstudy,variableshavebeenconstructedtocontrolfortheinﬂuenceofavariety
ofconservationprogramsonwaterconsumption. Mostoftheseprogramswereinstitutedinresponse
to the drought. The conservation variablescan be categorized as use restrictions, education, billing
information, landscaping, and plumbing (retro-ﬁt) programs. We ﬁnd that use restrictions and
landscaping programs proved effective in lowering water demand during the drought.
Our results indicate that water pricing as well as conservation policies are more effective in
inducing conservation under certain conditions. In particular, pricing policies inﬂuence water con-
sumption during non-rainy months (summer and parts of spring and fall), whereas pricing policies
are less signiﬁcant in winter. Households can exercise greater discretion during summer months
where outdoor activities such as ﬁlling swimming pools, washing cars and sidewalks and watering
lawns are common. The experience shared by water utility managers of the Bay Area during the
drought shows that using a proper mix of market and non-market policies to combat droughts can
successfully induce conservation behavior from their customers.
2. Literature Review
The literature on residential water demand is extensive. At the core of the literature lie the
complexitiesoftheoreticalandeconometricmodelingarisingfromtheblockratestructureofprices
2used in most municipalwater districts. Taylor (1975) and Nordin (1976) were the ﬁrst to propose a
model that accounted for the increasing or decreasing block rate structure of prices. These papers
proposed what has become known in the literature as the difference variable, where difference is
deﬁned as the amountthe consumer actually gets billed minus what the consumer would have been
billed ifall consumptionwascharged atthe same price asthe price for thelast unit ofconsumption.
A theoretical argument was made that this variable should be of equal magnitude, but opposite in
effect, to income in the case of increasing block rates, where it acts as a tax, and vice versa with
decreasing block rates, where it acts as a subsidy. This gave rise to a number of papers which tried
to test this relation empirically.2 Econometric estimation of these models has used instrumental
variables and two- or three-stage least squares techniques to try to correct for the bias that arises in
simple OLS estimation due to the co-determination of quantity, price and difference.3
A few papers in the water demand literature have studied the effectiveness of prices and con-
servation programs as tools for inﬂuencing water demand in the face of a drought. One example




episode, and that the conservationprogramwould mitigatethe necessaryincrease in price, but only
slightly. Similarly, the recent study of Fisher, Fullerton, Hatch and Reinelt (1995) compares the
cost-effectiveness of price-induced water conservation with other drought management tools such
as buildinga dam andconjunctiveuseof groundandsurfacewater. Theyﬁndthata combinationof
conjunctive use and conservation pricing are the least cost technique of managing a 25% reduction
in supply. On the other hand, Gilbert, Bishop and Weber (1990) argue that, during a drought,
2Many studies using the Taylor and Nordin price speciﬁcation have performed this test. These include Billings
and Agthe (1980), Foster Jr. and Beattie (1981), and Howe (1982). The only study to actually obtain estimates of
the income and difference variables that were equal but opposite in sign was Schefter and David (1985), which used
simulated data.
3See, for example, Chicoine, Deller and Ramamurthy (1986), Deller, Chicoine and Ramamurthy (1986), Jones and
Morris (1984), Nieswiadomy and Molina (1989).
3price elasticity studies are of limited use in predicting the impact of price changes on consumption
because other, drought related, forces have a stronger inﬂuence on consumption decisions.
Until recently, no attempt had been made to explicitly model the discrete choice embedded in
the decision process of the consumer facing a multi-tiered price schedule for water. By directly
modeling the discrete and continuous choice, using the two error model originally proposed in the
labor supply literature by Burtless and Hausman (1978), Hewitt and Hanemann (1995) solve the
co-determinationproblemin thecontext ofwater demand. Inthis study,we directlyaccountforthe
blockrate structureof pricesin its theoreticalmodelandeconometricspeciﬁcation. In addition, we
contribute to the current literature by including non-price conservation efforts in the econometric
speciﬁcationto gainsomeinsightsintoprice andnon-priceinﬂuenceson urbanwaterconservation.
3. An Aggregate Model of Residential Water Consumption
Contraryto traditionalconsumerdemandanalysis,thedemandfunctionfora goodfacing block
rate pricing is typically nonlinear, nondifferentiable and often includes discrete jumps. Conse-
quently, conventional demand curves cannot adequately represent consumer behavior when facing
a nonlinear budget constraint. While the derivation of the correct demand function is relatively
straightforward, the resulting demand function often changes the comparative statics results of
consumer demand and is relatively cumbersome for empirical estimation.4
The derivation of the water demand function for an individual begins with the speciﬁcation of
4In order to comply with space constraints, the full derivation of the water demand function with nonlinear budget
constraints is omitted from this version of the paper. The survey by Mofﬁtt (1986) provides a general derivation of the
demand function. Also see Hewitt and Hanemann (1995) for a careful derivationof the demand function in the context
of water demand with a three tiered block rate pricing structure. A longer version of this paper is available from the
authors that includes the full derivation of the model with m segments in the block rate pricing structure.

































where I isincome,di representsthedifferencevariablefortheith segment, x iswaterconsumption,
￿xi is level of consumption at which the price changes, and y is a vector of all other goods. Pi
represents the price of x on the ith segment of the budget constraint and y is the numeraire.
Typically, any ﬁxed charges are included in the difference variable as well. If we let di denote the


























to the budget constraint in equation (1). Since the budget constraint is clearly nondifferentiable,
optimization requires two stages. Conceptually, the optimization stages correspond to the continu-
ous and discrete choices faced by the consumer. In the ﬁrst stage of maximization, we choose the
optimal level of consumption for each segment of the kinked budget constraint. This stage results
in the conditional demand function. In the next stage, the consumer chooses the segment with the
conditional demand that maximizes overall utility.
Finally, combining the solutions to the continuous and discrete choice optimization problems
5The difference variable proposed by Taylor (1975) and Nordin (1976) is actually the negative of that deﬁned in
equation (2).











































































































































































We now specify an econometric model to estimate the water demand function. Previous em-
pirical studies that employ a models that account for the nonlinear budget constraint and resulting
endogeneityof prices, haveusedmicro-leveldatafor theiranalysis. This requiresexpensivesurvey
techniques to gather the relevant data. Instead, we utilize much cheaper and more readily available
aggregate data, in this case from three water districts in the Bay Area. This approach requires that
the demand functions in equation (3) be aggregated to accommodate the available data.
Initially, we sum the demand functions over all the consumers in the district. For the demand




































































































and n j and qj are the number of consumers and the average consumption on the jth segment. The
discretechoicecomponentoftheconsumerchoiceproblemdeterminesthenumberofhouseholdson





￿ conditional on being located in the jth block. Thus, the structure of the unconditional
demand function for micro-data (equation (3)) is essentially preserved in the aggregate demand
function.6
To control for populationdifferencesbetweenwater districts, we normalize bythe total number































































whereq isaverageconsumptionperhouseholdandsj isthefractionofconsumerslocatedinthe jth
price block. Although we cannot identify consumers located at the kinks, our data are rich enough
to identify the share of consumers and average consumption in each block.
In paststudies, thewater demandliteraturehasrecognizedtheimportanceof climate,socioeco-
nomic variables and the water-consuming capital stock (landscaping, swimming pools, bathrooms,
6The notable exception is that we are unable to consider the question of consumers locating at the kinks because
our aggregate data do not allow us to identify such consumers. We believe that the clustering problem is not serious
in our data set given that visual inspection of frequency distributions of customers across levels of consumption that
show strikingly little clustering at the kink points.
7plumbing ﬁxtures, etc.) in determining water consumption. We incorporate these commonly used
variables in our econometric model, but also include less frequently used variables such as speciﬁc
conservation measures employed by the different water districts to induce conservation. Including


















































wheret denotesthetimesubscript, Z representsthematrixofclimate,socioeconomic,capitalstock
and conservation variables,
￿ is the vector of unknown coefﬁcients, and
" is the unobserved error
term.
For convenience, we assume linear conditional demand curves. With this assumption, the































% is a vector of unknown parameters associatedwith the matrix Z. It would be inappropriate
to estimateequation(6) using the observedprobabilitiesof beinglocated on a particularsegmentsi
because they, like the conditional demands, are functions of preferences and are determined by the
consumer’s discrete choice problem. Therefore, they are correlated with the error term
" . To deal
with this issue, we estimate equation (6) in stages that are parallel to the discrete and continuous
stages of optimization of the consumer’s choice problem. We ﬁrst estimate the proportion of
households located in the different blocks, si, using a multinomial logit model.
The general format of the multinomial logit model is




















The characteristics are the same across all outcomes. Here, the observed dependent variable is a
proportion, si. X is a matrix of time speciﬁc characteristics such as temperature, precipitation,
income and household size. Given this speciﬁcation, we estimate the proportion of households
located in each block at time t in each district. We then utilize the predicted proportions for each
of the districts in our sample and estimate the unconditionaldemand function for all three districts.
The pooling technique utilized employs a set of assumptions on the disturbance covariance matrix
that gives a cross-sectionally heteroskedastic and timewise autoregressive model as described in
Kmenta (1986).7
The model speciﬁcation in equation (6) is similar to that of Schefter and David (1985). The
major difference is that the Schefter and David model makes no provision for how the probabilities
of being on a particular segment are determined.8 In other words, their consumer demand model
does not explicitly incorporate the discrete choice problem. Notice that if the error term is large,
thenobservedaveragehouseholdconsumptionmustbelarge, whichimpliesthatalarger fractionof
consumers must be located in the higher blocks. Thus, the observed probabilities si are positively
correlated with the error term.
Thedatautilizedforthisanalysisconsistofvariablescollectedforthreeresidentialwaterdistricts
from January 1982 to October 1992. The variables collected include consumption, price structure,
socio-economic, climate and conservation variables.
The quantity variables include the total amount of single family residential monthly consump-
tion of water for the district in ccf (100 cubic feet), the total number of single family residential
7The preferred technique for estimating equation (6) would be a two error maximum likelihood technique that
simultaneously estimates the discrete and continuous choice problems. We use the two stage approach described
because the price speciﬁcations(number of segments, increasing vs. decreasingblock rates) vary within and across the
districtsweconsider. Since thepricingstructuresvaryovertimewithinsomedistricts(SanLeandroandSanMateouse
both constant and increasing block rates in our sample), we cannot use the maximum likelihood technique previously
used in Hewitt and Hanemann’s (1995) paper.
8Schefter and David (1985) also differ in that the difference variable is not included in income.
9householdsinthedistrictpermonth,andthenumberofsinglefamilyresidentialhouseholdslocated
in each block per month. From the quantity variables we obtain our dependent variable q, where q
denotes monthly water consumption of the average household for the district.
The price structure variables collected include the ﬁxed monthly charge, the marginal price
associated with each block, and the quantity in ccf of water at which each kink occurs. All prices
are deﬂated. The socio-economic variables include I, which is deﬂated average monthly income,
collectedseparatelyforeachdistrict,andannualaveragehouseholdsize HHS foreachdistrict. The
climatevariablesaretemperature(Temp) andprecipitation(Precip), bothcollectedonan average
monthly basis and separately for each district. Temperature is measured in degrees Fahrenheit and
precipitation is measured in inches.
Conservation variables were constructed to measure the degree to which the residential water
districts implemented the different conservation programs available to them. Fifteen dummy vari-
ableswerecreatedtocapturetheeffectofconservationprogramsonwaterdemand. Thesevariables
deﬁnevariousconservationeffortsusingBillingInformation(informationincludedinperiodiccus-
tomer billing statements), Conservation Education, Use Restrictions, Landscaping Programs, and
Low-ﬂowPlumbingprograms(effortstoencouragetheuseoflowerwaterconsumingcapitalstock).
Table 1 contains a description of the codes used and their construction.
To measure the inﬂuence of price, we create the variable average marginal price, AMP. We
use the predicted proportions






￿ pit. This price
variable represents the mean marginal price faced in the district.9 The variable
￿ d is also created
using
￿s, and it represent the mean difference faced by all households.
4. Estimation and Results
The main results of the estimation are summarized in Table 2. Four speciﬁcations of the model
9Schefter and David (1985) were the ﬁrst to note that the correct marginal price to use in an aggregatesetting is the
mean marginal price and not the marginal price faced by the average consumer.
10Table 1: Construction of Conservation Dummies
Conservation Program 0 1 2 3




1 + 2 + bill in-
sert
Conservation Education None Flyers only 1 + speakers
bureau
1 + 2 + in-
school educa-
ation
Use Restrictions None % reduction or
allotment








1 + 2 + land-
scape audits
Low-ﬂow Plumbing None Retro-ﬁt kits
available
1 + rebates 1 + 2 + new
construction
code
were estimated using the 2-stage procedure discussed in Section 3, employing a set of assumptions
on the disturbance covariance matrix that gives a cross-sectionally heteroskedastic and time-wise
autoregressive model as described in Kmenta (1986). The values in parentheses are t-ratios.
The ﬁrst speciﬁcation, labeled Model 1, is the standard model of water demand used by most




the elasticity measure presented in Table 3 of
￿ 0
￿1710, which indicates a relatively inelastic price
response.
Model 2 expands the standard model by introducing the conservation to measure impact of the
districts’ conservation efforts. We ﬁnd that only the implementation of use restrictions (variable
UR2)andlandscapingaudits(Land3)aresigniﬁcantinreducingconsumption.10 Theseresultsseem
10Originally all conservationdummy variables were introduced, but only UR2 and Land3 provedsigniﬁcant. High
collinearitybetweenconservationprograms likely affectedthe individualestimatedinﬂuenceattributed to the different
programs. UR3and Land3wereusedexclusivelybySanLeandro. Theseprogramswereimplementedsimultaneously
atthebeginningofthedrought,andlastedforthedurationoftheavailabledata. Thus,wecannotseparatetheirindividual
effects on water consumption. UR2 was implemented in the Great Oaks district, also as a response to the drought.
11Table 2: Regression Results for Residential Water Consumption
Model 1 2 3 4
Constant -57.765 -66.697 -68.101 -68.101
(-7.7829) (-11.183) (-11.447) (-11.447)




￿ d 0.00189 0.0009 0.001148 0.001148
(1.9085) (0.94567) (1.2832) (1.2832)
HHS 22.476 27.369 26.919 26.919
(6.4277) (9.4840) (9.5605) (9.5605)
Temp 0.20902 0.21960 0.22418 0.22418
(7.8114) (8.5199) (8.7996) (8.7996)
Precip -0.13422 -0.17390 -0.18497 -0.18497
(-2.6424) (-3.4399) (-3.6492) (-3.6492)
UR2 -7.3257 -6.4111 -6.4111
(-3.0560) (-2.6415) (-2.6415)
Land3 -2.8163 -1.8099 -1.8099
(-5.2275) (-2.9561) (-2.9561)
D





n (per district) 130 130 130 130
Buse R2 0.3257 0.5044 0.5198 0.5198
Table 3: Price Elasticities (at means)
Model 1 2 4
Drought Normal
Non-rainy Months -0.21801 -0.22853 -0.30262 -0.13782
(-1.4007) (-1.7573) (-1.9212) (-1.2638)
All Months -0.17100 -0.11154 -0.12050 -0.00051
(-1.5227) (-1.0918) (-1.0192) (-0.05412)
12toindicatethatonlythemostaggressiveconservationprogramssigniﬁcantlyinﬂuenceconsumption.
Once we control for the inﬂuence of the conservation programs (use restrictions and landscape
audits ) on household consumption decisions in Model 2, the effect of average marginal price on
consumption is mitigated, and becomes statistically insigniﬁcantat conventionallevels, though the
sign is still “correct.”
Weusemodel3totestwhetherhouseholdsresponddifferentlytowaterpricesduringthedrought.
In other words, was there a structural shift in consumer behavior due to the drought? We create a
dummy variable, D, which takes on the value of 1 during the drought, and 0 otherwise, and look at
the interaction of AMP and D. For purposes of estimation, we deﬁne the beginning of the drought
as April 1988.11 Since we control for differencesin water needs through the precipitation variable,
any change in consumption behavior during the drought must be in response to the existence of the
drought, and not because of a lack of precipitation. We ﬁnd that there was indeed a structural shift
in demand during the drought as the estimated coefﬁcient for the D
￿ AMP variable is
￿ 2
￿4133
with a p-value of 0
￿ 0055. This conﬁrms our belief that households responded differently to price
signals during the drought than during normal periods of rainfall.
Whiletheestimatesofmodel3telluswhetherornothouseholdsbehaveddifferentlywithrespect
to water prices during the drought, the estimates of model 4 gives us different slope coefﬁcient
measures for price during the drought and during normal periods of rainfall. We make use of
C
￿ 1
￿ D to accomplish this. D
￿ AMP reﬂects the inﬂuence that price had on consumption
decisions during the drought, whereas C
￿ AMP reﬂects the estimated inﬂuence that price has
on consumption during normal periods of precipitation. Based on the estimated coefﬁcients of
D
￿ AMP and C
￿ AMP in Model 4, we construct price elasticities during the drought and during
periods of normal precipitation. These are presented in Table 3. When we consider all months,
andincludethe nonpriceconservationvariables,theeffect price hason consumptionduringnormal
11The regular rainy season in the Bay Area ends by the end of March. Therefore, expectations of additional rain are
insigniﬁcant by April.
13periods is negligible—the elasticity measure is
￿ 0
￿ 00051. During the drought, the price effect is
much stronger at
￿ 0
￿ 12050. The estimated inﬂuence of all other included variables stayed similar
across all speciﬁcations of the model in Table 2.
We estimatedthespeciﬁcationsusingthefulldatasetandarestricteddatasetthatincludedonly
thenon-rainymonthsintheBayArea, fromAprilto Octoberof1982to1992. Usingbothdata sets,
all coefﬁcients are of the expected sign, but, due to more discretionary water needs associated with
thenon-rainymonths,suchaswateringlawns,ﬁllingswimmingpools,washingcarsandsidewalks,
etc., are associated with larger impacts of changes in explanatory variables, including price. For
the sake of brevity, the estimates using only the non-rainy months are not reported here, but these
estimate are available on request.
6. Conclusions
In this paper we have analyzed consumption and conservation behavior for the San Francisco
Bay Area utilizing aggregate panel data comprised of three water utility districts. Our results indi-
cate that water pricing as well as conservation policies are more effective in inducing conservation
under certain conditions. In particular, pricing policies inﬂuence water consumption during non-
rainy months (summer and parts of spring and fall), whereas pricing policies are less signiﬁcant in
winter. Households can exercise greater discretion during summer months where outdoor activi-
ties such as ﬁlling swimming pools, washing cars and sidewalks and watering lawns are common.
Also, waterconsumptionintheBayAreaislowcomparedto SouthernCalifornia. Infact, Southern
California’s water consumption per household in 1991, the most severe year of the drought, was
approximatelyequivalentto the Bay Area’s consumption in 1986, the last year of normalprecipita-
tion before the drought began (Dixon, Moore and Pint (1996)). This empirical observation implies
that consumption in the Bay Area is closer to subsistence levels, so the response to price changes
should be expected to be low.
Our results also show price policies to be signiﬁcant in combating the drought. The inﬂuence
14thatprice has onconsumptionwas shownto begreater in periodsof drought. It is not clearwhether
this result is due to consumers’ reaction from perceiving change in price policy as a signal of the
severity of the drought, or whether this result truly represents a price effect.
Conservation programs such as use restrictions and landscaping programs proved effective in
loweringwater demandduringthe drought. The experiencesharedbywater utilitymanagersof the
Bay Area during the drought shows that using a proper mix of market and non-market policies to
combat droughts can successfully induce conservation behavior from their customers.
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